Journal of Political Science
Volume 35

Number 1

Article 5

November 2007

The Ratification of the EU Constitution: An American Perspective
on Why it Failed
Timothy S. Boylan

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Boylan, Timothy S. (2007) "The Ratification of the EU Constitution: An American Perspective on Why it
Failed," Journal of Political Science: Vol. 35 : No. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol35/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Politics at CCU Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Political Science by an authorized editor of CCU Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact commons@coastal.edu.

The Ratification of the EU Constitution:
An Amer ican Perspective on Why it
Failed
Timothy S. Boylan
Winthrop University

To a teacher and researcher of American constitutional law and
theOJJ'. an overall examination of the proces s of constitutionmaking is an irresistible project. The project began with an article published in this journal (Boylan 2005) on the framing of the
European Union :S Constitutional Treaty. This study is the result
of a year :S Sabbatical (2004-2005) spent in Europe. During
that time. the author visited 21 of the 2 5 current EU member
states. conduc ted numerous interviews with legal scholars, politicians and civic leader/ and both studied and taught in a European institution as a visiting Fulbright professor. All that follows
is the result of reading. listening and then drawing comparisons
as an American observe,'.
he Convention on the Future of Europe provided a unique
opportunity for academics and students of constitutional
theory to survey three phases of constitution mak.ingenactment, ratification and enforcement-as they unfolded. As
one writer observed, "Those who are witness to this historic
process are extremely fortunate. In the United States, many
watch with awe and envy as Europeans confront the opportunity
to create the most sophisticated, up-to-date, enlightened constitu-

T

' Interviews were conducted with 35 individuals , including 12 political science professors, 6 law school professors, 4 think tank scholars, 2 business professionals , I religious
leader, 3 educational administrators, 2 ambassadors, I retired United Nations official, I
translator . and 3 professors from other disciplines .

'J'I 11•: JOUll
\ ' OLUME

,\I. OF l'OLl'J'IC ,\J, SC II': Cl •:
35 2007 l' ,\c;J (S 12 7-160

128

BOYLAN

tion of modern time" (Gormley 2003). 2 The scale, scope, ambition and significance of the European project created great interest across a wide range of disciplines, from law to politics, from
economics to public policy. Naturally, it also invited comparison
and contrast with the American experience of 200 years earlier.
The question posed here is, why did the EU fail to ratify its
constitution? A working hypothesis is that the document failed
for reasons only indirectly related to its substantive provisions.
Rather, the sheer size and complexity of the document frustrated
attempts to read, summarize or promote it. Further, both proponents and detractors could mine the text in order to portray it in
radically different terms. The very complexity of the constitutio n
was a signal to some that its goal-an ever closer union-would
be a 70,000-plus word Trojan horse that would allow Brussels to
insinuate itself via further regulation, standardization, and homogenization in order to overwhelm the member states. The debate over the constitution became a debate over the political
economy of Europe. Highly symbolic and emotionally-charged
issues-job security, national identity, Muslim immigration and
assimilation, social welfare and pension benefits-animated debate and discussion. Gurfinkiel concluded
In theory, the referendum on Europe had nothing to do with
domestic politics. In practice, as everyone understood, things
were different. A strong no vote would be taken as a demand
for deep changes at home, if not a species of popular revolt"
(2005, 39).

The process of ratification; with some members opting for
referendum, some for parliamentary approval and some for a
combination of each; became a contentious and confusing affair.
' Although Gom1ley focuses attenlion on the period of the Articles of Confederation , he
concludes that "the American experience does provide invaluable lessons when it comes
to constructing a forward-thinking and enduring European Constitution ." at 101.
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Meanwhile, the claim that the Convention had been hijacked by
elites and that the draft constitution did not address the "democratic deficit" led some members, most notably France, to change
direction and offer their citizens the chance to give direct approval through an up-or-down vote. In the end, the procedural
requirement that ratification be unanimous magnified the importance of each member's choice. Each was, potentially, a veto of
one. In late May of 2005, two founding members of the European Union, France and the Netherlands, voted the constitution
down by sizable margins. While a number of member states have
proceeded with ratification votes following the French and Dutch
referenda (the significance of which will be discussed in the final
section), the combined votes of these two pivotal member states
"shelved" the constitution for the foreseeable future. 3
Observers have been cautious about comparing and contrasting the Convention on the Future of Europe with the Philadelphia Convention of some 200 years earlier. There are some who
have utilized the language of comparison in speeches and scholarly works (de Burca 2004) only to minimize those possibilities
in the text of their arguments. For instance, one scholar asked,
(Are there] any real parallels with the adoption of the US
Constitution in 1787 as a replacement for the Articles of
Confederation, or do the great differences in historical context and circumstance render such a comparison entirely inappropriate? According to a number of influential
commentators, the two processes do not bear serious comparison (de Burca 2004, 583). 4

' Immediately following the French and Dutch votes, Britain announced that it was suspending indefinitely any consideration of the constitutional treaty . Within a short time,
Denmark , Ireland , Poland, and the Czech Republic followed suit.
' Note, however , that de Burca does draw out two clear parallels - the need for external
security and the prevention of internal dissent - which form the thesis of her paper . She
conclude s, "Nonetheless , taking the different circumstances of history and time into
Nore continue s
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Jurgen Habermas failed to find any parallels with either the convention in Philadelphia or the French Revolutionaries at the Assemblee Nationale in Paris at the close of the 19th Century
(2001). Each of those earlier gatherings was "engaged in an extraordinary undertaking, without historical precedent (pp. 5-6)"
and addressed very different challenges. For Habermas, the mission of EU convention was "not to invent anything, but to conserve the great democratic achievements of the democratic
nation state" (p. 6).
Although Neil Walker would not disagree with Habennas'
overall assessment, he would note that a constitution is often a
cause of integration and not necessarily an outgrowth of it. If
Europe lacked the social preconditions to mobilize the Euro pean
citizenry around a new constitution, perhaps the framing and
promotion of the document would help create those preconditions. He cautions readers against an inflexible view of causeand-effect and concludes
Of course, Constitutions cannot take root in entirely fallow
ground. Yet it is often overlooked that Constitutions have historically been agents of integration, rather than mere endorsements of existing political communities, in just these
circumstances where traditional sources of cultural or political
identification are not readily available-think
of eighteenthcentury America with its diverse immigrant communities, or
twentieth-century Germany defeated and divided by war

(2006, 13).
Paul Magnette maps out three broad thematic areas that caution observers against drawing out comparisons with the American experience. He states
account, it is clearly the case that much of the political energy directed towards the promotion and justification of a constitution for the EU at the present time is focused on its
relation to the external world, and in strengthening its perceived internal unity {p. 583).

TlfEJOURNi\L

OF POLITICAL

SCll ·'.NCr-.

131

Tl/£ RATIFICATION OF THE EU CONSTITUTION

It was however naYve to think that the Convention could be
· Europe's Philadelphia.' First because, before the Convention, the EU was already much stronger than the loose
American confederation: it was a firm and largely accepted
legal order based on federal principles; it comprised stable
and permanent institutions, some directly elected by citizens;
and was based on a intensely regulated single market and a
common currency. Secondly, European states at the beginning of the twenty-first century, with their long history,
strong national identities, large fiscal resources and redistributive policies, cannot be compared to the young, weakly
populated and recently independent 'states' which formed
the American Confederation. Finally, nothing in the present
European situation could create a pressure comparable to the
context of military, commercial, political, moral and religious crisis that had given rise to the Philadelphia process

(2003, 7).

This study offers a different perspective. 5 While care should
be taken to avoid spurious connections, the year bracketed by the
accession of the ten new member states (May, 2004) and the
French and Dutch referenda (May/June, 2005) demonstrated that
valid, meaningful and intriguing parallels could be drawn between the success of the American constitutional process (in the
framing, promotion and ratification of the draft document) and
the failure of the European project. Further, a survey of the provisions of the text, the process of ratification and the politics of
the debates provides clear indications of how and why the European text was scuttled and may provide some direction for future
efforts to revise, revive or reintroduce the constitutional treaty.
' I am not dismissing the aforementioned scholars who warned against making direct
comparisons. Each of these commentators wrote before the completion of the final draft
document and the beginning of the ratification process. These writers cautioned about
making comparisons tied to the motives of the framers. My intent here is to focus on the
dynamics or ratification.
VOi..
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PROVISIONS AND POLITICS:
A 70,000 WORD RORSCHACH TEST

6

The European Union has grown and evolved over the last
fifty years from a loose economic and trade confederation of six
nations to the current union of twenty-five member states
(Gurfinkiel 2005). Over the latter half of the 20th CenhITy, a
cluster of treaties enabled the Union's members to trade more
freely, adopt a single currency and agree on issues from immigratio n to the environment. 7 These treaties have been cumulative,
in that each built upon, but did not replace, the existing agreements . Further , the founding treaties have been amended on several occasions, usually coinciding with the addition of new
member states. The draft EU constitution was a departure from
these arrangements, as it aimed to replace all of the existing treaties with a single, comprehensive text.
Not until 2000 had there been a serious proposal to consider
a constitution for Europe . Beginning with the proposal by Joschka Fischer (Nelson and Stubb 2003 , 70-75) ,8 the German foreign minister, the turn of the century witnessed a vigorous debate
over the feasibility and desirability of a constitutional document.
In the years that followed, a plan took shape for a Conven tion for
the Future of Europe that would frame a draft document. For
sixtee n months during 2002-2003, the convention drew over 200
delegates from over twenty countries. These "framers'' sought to
1
'

The Rorschach test, commonly known at the " Ink Blot Test," is named after Swiss
psychiatrist Hermann Rorschach . It functioned as a personality analysis test in which the
person being tested was asked to identify what is su1;1gestedto him by a series of ink blot
designs of various shapes .
7
It is beyond the scope of this study to survey the history and pro visions of the existing
Europea n Union treaties . Europa, the official website of the EU, provides an excellent
treatment of the treaties (http ://europa .eu .int/abc/treaties/index_en.htm) . A more comprehensive history of the treaties can be found in Churc h, Clive 1-1
. and David Phinnemore,
2002. The Penguin Guide to 1/re European Union Treaties. London : Penguin Books, Llcl.
• Speech given at Humboldt University in Berlin , May 12. 2000.
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codify the treaties that had bound the nations of Europe together
since the middle of the 20th Century and to both articulate and
clarify the core principles that had brought about the call for a
constitution. These principles, articulated by French President
Jacques Chirac in a speech before the German Bundestag in
2000, included the following: (I) making the European Union
more democratic, as there was a common perception that the
building of Europe had been, for the most part, the work of leaders and elites; (2) clarifying the division of responsibilities
among the different levels of the European system, while recog9
nizing the need to apply the principle of"subsidiarity;" (3) guaranteeing that enlargement and progress would be mutually
supportive; and (4) ensuring that Europe would have strong institutions and effective decision-making mechanisms where majority voting was the rule and that majority voting would reflect the
relative weights of the member states (Nelson and Stubb 2003,
75-78). IO
The final draft document covered these points and more. The
70,000 word text had four major sections. Part I contained the
institutional reforms that brought the succession of past treaties
together. Part II, a constitution in itself, incorporated the prolix
Charter of Fundamental Rights that had been adopted in 2000.
Part III streamlined, simplified and re-stated already existing
European Union treaty law. Part rv, similar to Articles V and VII
of the US Constitution, contained the procedures for ratification
and amendment.
Scholars, politicians, journalists and observers soon developed conflicting descriptions. The disagreement over terminol., Subsidiarity is the doctrine that governance should take place at the lowest possible, or
most sensible , level . President Chirac described it as the need to have answers provided at
the level closest to the problems al hand.
'" From the text of the speech by French President Jacques Chirac before the German
Bundestag on June 27. 2000 .

\'01, .
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ogy became confusion over identity . The key leaders of the Convention found themselves juggling terminology from speech to
speech. Valery Giscard d' Estaing, President of the Convention,
first suggested the use of the term "constitutional treaty." Many
participants at the Convention, however, had opted for the more
unequivocal language of "constitution." Others referred to the
document as the "constitutional text." When the final text appeared in July of 2003, it was named the "treaty establishing a
11
Constitution for Europe."
Some scholars have suggested that the Convenbon failed to
produce a true constitution . The text, bringing together and
meshing the provisions of the treaties that preceded it, could not
be legally distinguished from its predecessors . But it was envisioned, written and promoted as a constitution . And the use of
that language created expectations, assumptions, fears and complications that could not easily be answered or resolved by the
proponents of the document.
Misunderstanding emerged in two ways. First, the length and
detail of the document meant that it was very difficult for citizens, groups, and even leaders to have a comprehensive grasp on
its contents. Not only was it difficult to fully apprehend, but it
was also relatively easy to either misrepresent or selectively attack. In a certain sense, it was a form of political Rorschach test
that enabled groups across the political spectrum to justify their
fears about the direction and scope of European enlargement,
integration and unification . Richard Bellamy observed that "the
drafters side-stepped their disagreements by choosing formulations that were so abstract that all sides could read into them
what they liked. Yet, this strategy merely postpones the day of
11
See de Burca (2004, 560) for further description of how the language of the document
reflected the complexity and ambiguity surrounding the process of enactment and the
debate over ratification .
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reckoning and assumes legitimate bodies exist to decide the
question, which is doubtful (Bellamy, 2006)." In France, resistance from the left focused on Part III, the existing body of EU
law and policies that have developed since the 1950s. In essence,
Part [Il contained little that was new or innovative. However, the
French "Non" campaign was successfully able to describe that
section of the Constitution as the high road to further globalization and enlargement with the concurrent loss of French sover12
eignty and autonomy. The left coalition's ability to link this
section of the Constitution with the British free-market economic
model-with the attendant fears for the future of the French social welfare system-advanced
a frightening interpretation of the
text. Thus, a section of the text that did little more than formalize and streamline already existing arrangements was portrayed
as a dangerous new development. One writer observed
With Part Ill recapitulating 50 years of European integration,
moreover, the referendum gave voters their first-ever opportunity to challenge formally and directly core features of the
EU: its competition policy, the freedom-of-movement rules
in the single market (notably the liberalization of services),
the euro and the EU's monetary policy, and enlargement.
The pre-referendum debates also reflected dissatisfaction
with slow growth and high unemployment, immigration,
enlargement and "social dumping" from new members, the
prospect of Turkish membership, globalization, and the
growing competition from China and the United States.
They revealed profound worry about Europe's ability to address these concerns, especially as a group of 25 heterogeneous members increasingly unable to act efficiently and

"There was as much resistance from the right-wing parties in France as there was from
the Jen. The right's J'earor unbridled immigration and the resulting threat to job security,
coupled wllh rears over Turkey joining the Union, helped bring about a coalition of the
right and the Jen against ratification.
\'OL.
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with no stable geographic or cultural borders in sight. Never
mind that the constitutional treaty improved the institutional
framework and decision-making process of the EU and did
little else (Cohen-Tanugi 2005 , 57-58).

No referenda were held in Eastern European countries and
many of the national parliaments in those countries were quick to
ratify the document without protests or resistance. Public opinion
polls showed that citizens in Eastern European countries had less
overall knowledge of the contents of the constitution, but were
generally supportive of the document and saw it, on whole, as a
positive development. 13 It simply reflected and confim1ed their
newly acquired "belonging" to Europe and symbolized their
freedom from an oppressive and heartbreaking past. Even in
Spain, a vigorous yes campaign managed to only get a bare constitutional minimum (42%) of voters to the polls, and exit polling
revealed that most citizens were ratifying the positive performance of the Spanish economy in recent years. A poll commissioned in mid-2003 by the Elcano Royal Institute, a Madridbased think tank, had found that only 1% of Spaniards knew
what the constitutional convention was meant to do. Eighteen
months later, with no apparent turnabout in public awareness,
Spanish voters ratified the new constitution.
In the less benign contexts of the French and Dutch referenda , the government-sponsored yes campaigns could not overcome the perception that the constitution would lock in trends
and developments with deeply negative consequences. Peter Hylarides' survey of the Dutch referendum noted

" See findings from the first Eurobarometer survey on the proposed Constitution. At:
http ://ec.europa.eu/p ublic_opinion/nash/n 159_2en.pdf. See pp. f 6-28 on the specific
questions covering the content of the Constitution and pp. 29-30 on the conclusions. Note
the language indicating that, "T he rate of correct answers is significantly less high in the
new me,nber states." (p. 24).
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The first opinion poll canied out in January on behalf of the
government showed that only 30 per cent of the population
was in favor of the constitution. More than 80 per cent of the
electorate indicated that they had no idea what the constitution was about, whilst two-thirds thought the European constitution would replace the Dutch constitution (2006, 89-90).
The debates played on passions and fears, with little effort to
delve into the structure and meaning of the text. In the end,
"hardly any of the treaty's new substance was debated during the
French and Dutch referendum campaigns. The absence of a wellfocused discussion only compounded the effect of the potent
misrepresentation that smTounded the text from the beginning"
(Cohen-Tanugi 2005, 56).
The second misunderstanding was centered more on how the
process took place than on the document itself. One of the core
purposes for enacting a constitution was to address the concept
of a "democratic deficit" that had emerged from the Danish re14
jection of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. There were high expectations that the process of constitution-making would bring in
" The democratic deficit has also been termed a "legitimacy gap ." The gap has been
defined as the popular perception rhat EU government lacks accountability and responsiveness. C'riucs contend that each successive treaty has pushed power away from democrat1cally elected national governments and towards supra-national institutions and
bureaucracies far removed from democratic accountability.
The European Union continues to struggle with finding the proper balance between
centralized and coordinated power in Brussels and national sovereignty within the member states. During the ratification debates over the U.S. Constitution , great care was taken
to ensure the states that their sovereignty would not be jeopardized . The Supremacy
Clause was balanced by the enumerated powers reserved to the states in Article I, Section
9, and by the later inclusion of the Tenth Amendment. The text of the American Constitution clearly marked out the scope and limits of the new government's power in a way that
the EU Constitution's treatment or "subsidiarity" did not. For a further discussion comparing the two documents, see my earlier essay in this Journal. Vol. 33 2005. pp. 1- 38.
For an inforn1ative roundtable on the question of democratic legitimacy in the wake of
the no votes. see Moravcsik. Andrew . 2005 . "Europe Without Illusions ." Prospect. Issue
112. July. pp. 22-26 .
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diverse voices from across the political, cultural and geographical spectrum, and would symbolize a new phase of democratic
openness within the EU . Jo Shaw noted
Since its creation was first announced in December of 200 I
at the Laeken European Council meeting, very substantial
expectations have been invested in the Convention on the
Future of the Union by many observers of the European integration process. Perhaps it could finally address the yawning legitimacy gap that appears to have opened up in
European public affairs since the time of the Treaty of Maastricht, leading to a widespread alienation between the activities of the European institutions and those whom they are
meant-like any public bodies-to serve, that is, the citizens
and residents of the member states (2003).
Leaders hoped that the inclusiveness of the Convention and an
array of communications strategies (the Convention had its own
dedicated website with daily updates) would begin to address the
question of democratic legitimacy . For the vast majority of
Europeans, they didn't. It was then hoped that the ratification
process would create public dialogue and cause individual citizens and interest groups to delve into the specific provisions of
the document. By early 2005 and the opening salvos of the
French and Dutch battles for their respective referendum votes,
there was concern that the democratic process would yield an
ironic result: the very democratic process that the framers hoped
to bring about through the creation of the constitution would occasion its downfall. 15 In his May 2000 speech at Humboldt Uni-

,., A number of scholars have noted the irony that the democratic process. through the
referendum , would be the agent whereby the Constitution would fall. For Whitman, "It is
ironic that the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe should have been called into
question by the citizens of the EU member states . as one of the original purposes envisaged for the treaty was to bring the EU and its institutions closer to those citizens ." See
Note continues
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versity calling for a constitution, Gennany's
Joschka Fisher, warned

foreign minister,

[T]his process of European integration that is now being
called into question by many people; it is viewed as a bureaucratic affair run by a faceless, soulless Eurocracy in
Brussels-at best boring, at worst dangerous ...
Europe is not a new continent, so the criticism goes, but full
of different peoples, cultures, languages and histories. The
nation-states are realities that cannot simply be erased, and
the more globalization and Europeanization create superstructures and anonymous actors remote from their citizens,
the more the people will cling on to the nation-states that
give them comfort and security ...
That is why it would be an irreparable mistake in the construction of Europe if one were to try to complete political
integration against the existing national institutions and traditions rather than by involving them. Any such endeavor
would be doomed to failure by the historical and cultural environment in Europe (Nelsen and Stubb 2003, 70-75).

Despite an extended and intensive effort, the proponents of
the new constitution could not overcome the perception that the
draft text threatened "existing national institutions and traditions
rather than by involving them." In both France and the Netherlands, the fear of losing sovereignty and autonomy made the cost
of ratification high and the cost of rejection low. In each country,
the threats to existing benefits and arrangements were clear,
while the potential benefits to further integration were not.
Fisher's warning proved to be a prescient one.

Whitman, Richard. "No and After: Options for Europe ." !11ternntio11al
Affairs. Vol. 81.
o. 4. p. 673 .
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These issues of size , complexity and accessibility stand in
stark contrast to the American experience. The Philadelphia
Convention produced a spare, 7000-word text that contained
both enumeration and detail (as seen in the Article I, Section 8
powers granted to Congress) and ambiguity (as seen in the power
and role of the judicial branch described in Article III) . For the
most part , it was a structuring document that sought to remedy
the shortcomings of the Articles of Confederation and be acceptable to the cluster of audiences awaiting it in the state ratifying
conventions. Rather than touch off debate about what the document said , the months following the close of the Philadelphia
Convention focused on what tbe text meant. There was no need
to wallow through 200-plus pages of complex , and sometimes
conflicting verbiage , wondering how the various guarantees and
provisions would mesh . While many other factors come into play
when comparing the American and European ratification processes , the size and complexity of the European text and the implications of those factors cannot be ignored . As one
commentator quipped , "The U.S. Constitution of 1787 is short,
lucid , reassuringly specific and yet usefully vague" (Garfinkiel
2005 , 45) . In comparison , the American experience largely
lacked the "Rorschach test" quality that was so clearly seen in
the Spanish , French and Dutch referenda. In America , the debate
focused on the text , and not on what various audiences and
groups "saw" hovering over the text. As Bernard Bailyn describes ,
The initial publication of the Constitution on September 17,
1787, and Congress ' s call for the states to vote on ratification touched off one of the most extensive public debates on
constitutionalism and on political principles ever recorded .
The entire political nation was galvani zed in the debate. Literally thousands of people , in this nation of appro ximately
one million eligible voters, participated in one way or anTI IE J O U R
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other. There were some fifteen hundred official delegates to
the twelve state ratifying conventions, where every section,
every clause, and every phrase of the Constitution was raked
over. There was a multitude of newspaper commentaries,
sermons, letters, broadsides and personal debates on the
Constitution; they turned up in even the most remote comers
of the nation (2003, I07).
Despite the claim that "the text of the Constitution for
Europe is to a far greater extent the result of codification and
consolidation of existing EU and EC law principles than of institutional change" (Ziller 2005, 251 ), the ratification process in
Europe saw the constitution more as symbol than as substance.
How else can the French vote be explained? Opponents to the
text from opposite ends of the ideological spectrum could unite,
play upon the public's Jack of knowledge about the text, and shift
the focus of debate. Cohen-Tanugi explains,
A clever, ad hoc opposition-to the treaty, European integration, EU enla~gement, the market economy, globalization, and some national governments-took advantage of the
public's mixed feelings about Europe by obscuring the basic
fact that the constitutional convention's rational and wellmtentioned central objective had been to address some of the
EU's shortcomings and distill its main tenets into a single
comprehensive and streamlined document (2005, 57).
In the end, the EU constitution failed in large part because its
provisions were seen abstractly and symbolically rather than
concretely and substantively. For the newly acceded nations of
Eastern Europe, the document represented freedom, democracy
and economic opportunity. For the Spaniards, it was symbolic of
the significant economic gains that the country has made over
the past fifteen years . But for the core founding countriesFrance and the Netherlands-it
was seen (by a definitive majority of voters) as a departure from, and a threat to, the social con\'OL.
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tract, economic security and national autonomy of each. Substantive debate , such as what was witnessed across the American
states in the 1780s , was undermined and outwitted by a determined opposition . One of the EU's most cogent observers conceded
One is forced to conclude that the constitution became controversial not because its content was objectionable, but because the content was so innocuous that citizens saw a
chance to cast an inexpensive protest vote ... So it was not
the substance of the emerging constitutional settlement that
triggered opposition. The objectionable aspect was its form:
an idealistic constitution (Moravcsik 2005, 56-57).
Any future attempts to reconsider the European constitution will
have to confront the size , scope and complexity of the original
draft , and perhaps take into account the history and dynamics of
the American ratification process. A shorter , more concise document may allow readers to comprehensively grasp its contents
and to better focus on its substantive provisions.
PROCESS AND POLITICS: WHEN? HOW? HOW MANY?

In looking for reasons why the Constitution of the Europe
failed , attention must be turned to the procedural choices made
by the architects of the document. Care must be taken when
making comparisons and drawing contrasts with the American
experience - here more than in other sections. Paul Magnette's
warning needs to be revisited and respected (2003) . However, a
distinction can be made between differences which prevent
meaningful comparisons and those that provide and invite the
same.
The Strategy of Sequence. The proponents of the new constitution hoped to build momentum by securing a number of enthusiastic "yes" votes at the beginning . The parliaments of
TIIEJO
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Lithuania and Hungary voted in late 2004 and approved the constitution (as did every parliamentary vote) by wide margins. 16
Slovenia's parliament followed in early February. The Spanish
referendum was in late February . The Spanish vote became a
matter of some speculation, not because the direction of the vote
was in doubt, but because Spanish law mandated that a referendum would only be binding if 40% of the eligible electorate
voted. A public relations blitz, which included high-profile visits
from the French and German heads of state and the endorsements of a host of public figures and celebrities, garnered just
enough interest and response by voting day. A slight percentage
above the mandated minimum, 42%, came out to vote and 77%
of those voted in favor of the constitution. After the Spanish referendum, the parliaments of Italy, Greece , Slovakia and Austria
ratified the document by wide to near-unanimous margins. By
the end of May, eight nations had ratified the constitution with
the lowest parliamentary majority approving by 81%. 17 The hope
was that the momentum of the earlier votes would influence the
closer and, in some instances, more strategically important, referenda.
Emboldened by the outcome in Spain, the Dutch government fixed its own referendum for June I 51, and France moved its
vote forward from June to May. Each hoped to benefit from the
1
'' The Lithuanian parliament voled 84-4 to ratify the constitution. The Hungarian parliament's vote was 304-9. A website for tracking ratification is sponsored by the BBC. For a
rundown on each country's ·status, see "EU Constitution: Where member states stand" at
hItp://news vote.bbe. co.uk/mpapps/pagetooIs/print/news.bbc.co.uk/ I/h i/world/europe/39 5
4327.stm.
17
II should be noted that the German Bu11d
esm1 surprised most observers by voting to
ratify the constitution on May 27, 2005, just 48 hours before the French referendum. The
81111deswg
had voted its approval on May 12. This was widely seen as an effort to give
ihc French a symbol of solidarity and provide one final motivational push. llowever , the
German bill to ratify has never been signed by President llorsl Koehler, and Germany
remarns in the "nearly rat,lied" category.
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added to the momentum provided by the earlier parliamentary
votes. Might more yes votes and more momentum changed the
outcome in France and/or the Nether lands? The final section of
this paper notes that, as of January 2007, seven countries have
ratified the constitution since the French and Dutch votes . Perhaps more pressure could have been brought to bear on the German and Belgian governments to sign off on the approval from
their parliaments . Add those seven yes votes to the mix , and a
majority of the member states would have given approval to the
text. What can now be seen as a tactical decision on the part of
France and the Netherlands - hurrying to take advantage of the
Spanish yes vote-may have been the right idea at the wrong
time. However , leaders from each country saw an erosion of
support for ratification - a trend moving counter to the accumulation of more yes votes from other member states . The "frontloading" of members strongly in favor of the constitution
paralleled that of the early ratification debates in America . The
outcome did not.
Big States, Small States. What is also true of both processes
is that , while all ratifying votes were important, some were essential. In the American instance, certain states had to ratify if
the new constitution (and the new nation that it constituted) was
to succeed. Virginia, Pennsylvania , Massachusetts and New York
were the bell weather states. The first three states held 45% of
the free population. New York was of signal geographical importance- its territory could split the union into two, noncontiguous sections. If one or more of these states voted down
the constitution, the future of "a more perfect union" envisioned
in the Preamble was in serious doubt.
Likewise, the votes in France , Germany , Italy and the United
Kingdom were equally necessary. An impressive 57% of the
population and 66% of the economic productivity came from
these four nations . The Italian and German votes were handled in
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accumulation of yes votes and to ride Spain's momentum. Public
opinion polls indicated that the Dutch were growing steadi ly
more disenchanted over immigration and with the country's
status as the largest net per capita contributor to the EU budget.
In France, polls showed that the yes votes had fallen from 69%
to 61 % in the first three months of 2005 (Crumley 2005). "The
Dutch wanted to set an early referendum date before resentment
grows too high," explained Dominique Reynie, a European affairs expert at Paris' Foundation of Political Science. 'T he
French want to hold theirs first because the risk of a no vote in
the Netherlands is greater and the probable yes vote in France
will increase pressure on the Dutch not to drop the ball. They
hope each successive passage will make it harder for voters to
break ranks and reject the text" (in Cmmley 2005, 40).
There is an intriguing parallel here with the state ratifying
conventions that debated and voted on the US Constitution. The
first five state conventions' votes were quickly taken and overwhelming positive, with three conventions voting unanimous ly
to ratify. Between December 7, 1787 and January 8, 1788, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia and Connecticut
placed themselves in the "yes" column. But these were the easy
votes. With only one exception, Maryland, all of the succeeding
ratification votes would be closely contested and the winning
margins would be considerably smaller. 18
While hindsight always provides a degree of clarity and confidence, it can be said that the proponents of the new constitution
had the correct strategy but may have failed to get the timing
right. The Spanish referendum was a confidence builder, and it
" It should also be noted that North Carolina, the 12th state to vote, rejected ratification
by a wide margin ( 184-84). It would take another fifteen months before North Carolina's
convention would reconvene , reconsider their position , and vote to ratify . A chart showing the state convention votes can be seen in Farber , Daniel A. and Suzanna Sherry .
1990. A History of the Americn11Co11s1i1utio11
. St. Paul: West Publishing . p. 216 .
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the respective parliaments. The French and British governments
resisted, but eventually gave into, popular approval via the referendum. While such can only be surmised, a no vote from Ma lta
and Slovenia would not have the impact of a no from France or
Germany. Despite the unanimous vote requirement (discussed
below), all votes are not created equal. A single no from a new ly
acceded Eastern state against 24 yes votes would likely have occasioned a re-vote or the possibility of exclusion from the rest of
the EU going forward under the new constitution. But the no
votes in two of the six founding nations of the EU, and the wide
margin by which they prevailed, could not be countered, dismissed or interpreted away.
E Pluribu s Unum? The most telling factor in Europe's ratification process was the requirement that all member states say
yes. As the Convention on the Future of Europe began to consider the possibility that the constitutional treaty would rep lace,
rather than be incorporated into the existing legal framework,
questions arose concerning the risk to the continuity of the acquis communautaire. 19 Along with this issue arose the question
of how the new constitutional treaty would be ratified and enforced. One scholar observing the Convention in late 2002 reported that,
This discussion focused on the possibility that the Constitutional Treaty might enter into force while it has not
been ratified by every Member State. In a working document outlining a draft Constitution of the European Union, the European Commission underlined that under
current Treaty rules, one Member State Could block the
entry into force of the new Constitutional Treaty. To
"' The entire body of European laws is known as the acquis co1111111111a111nire.
This includes all the treaties , regulations and directives passed by the European institutions as
well as judgments laid down by the Court of Justice. The tenn is most often used in connection with preparations by candidate countries to join the union.
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avoid such a situation , the Commission working document proposed that Member States failing to ratify the
Constitutional Treaty would be deemed to withdraw
from the Union. While Convention President Giscard
had spoken in a similar vein , the proposal was immediately rejected by the representative of the UK government , who argued that Member States could not be held
' at gunpoint ' like that (Devuyst 2003 , 36) .

The Convention considered , but rejected , changes to the
standing rules. This meant that the locus of power remained with
the individual member state and not with the European Union as
a collective whole . Each country was a veto of one, at least on
paper. Thi s brought about a difficult arrangement. The final draft
document contained so many protections , regulations and provisions that there was something for virtually everyone to oppose .
And, the unanimous vote requirement caused many observers to
doubt that the document could pass unscathed through 25 separate votes . From legal scholars who insisted that the constitution
must be ratified to those who did not think that failure would
bring about a crisis , most expressed some doubt or reservation
about the chance for success . Why? The unanimity requirement.
Carlos Closa concluded, "In a 12 or 15 member community ,
unanimity (costly as it was) allowed the accommodation of even
antagonistic visions through strenuous efforts . With 25 members,
unanimity seems a recipe for disintegration" (Closa 2005 , 5).
Consider the American ratification process in the late l 780s.
The US Constitution called for a supennajority (67% or 9/ 13) of
the states to ratify the document before it became the new charter
of government. The Americans had faced the same dilemma as
the EU Convention did in late 2002 . Under the Articles of Confederation , amendments required a unanimous vote . During the
time that the Articles were in force , no amendments came close
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to passing . Boylan 's earlier prior study of the US and EU constitutional framing concluded,
The framers of the [US) Constitution looked back on [the
Articles'] shortcomings as they developed the procedures
for ratifying the document... This framework still required a substantial amount of agreement on the part of
the states, but eliminated the threat of an absolute veto
from any individual state. As a result, each state ratifying
convention had to face the possibility that it could reject
the new government and that it would still be brought
into being by the other states. The ability to veto and
thwart the process was replaced by the potential to reject
and be left as an outcast. While many of the state debates
were heated and the final tally close, the whole process
took less than one year and the overall vote was, eventually, unanimous. Much of this success can be linked to
the rules set for ratification (2005, 30).

How might the EU process have changed with a supermajority
requirement for ratification? France could have still played the
role of spoiler, and a crisis would have ensued as the EU could
not effectively operate without France. But it can be sunnised
that the other nations would have continued the process , to determine if whatever supermajority requirement agreed upon was,
in fact, met.
This brings up an interesting "w hat if." What if the EU constitution mandated a supermajority requirement for ratification say, 21 of 25 yes votes were needed to bring the document into
force. What if the French and Dutch votes were followed by a
rejection from the Czech Republic, but all other members voted
to ratify. What then? The "glass half empty" view would wonder
if the EU could continue to further integrate without the three
rejecting countries. However , the "g lass half full" camp could
counter with the question of whether those three could, or would
want to, make it alone without the European Union. Rules de1'111•: JOURNAi.
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terrnine outcomes (witness, for example the institution of the
Electoral College in the United States and the outcome of the
2000 presidential elections) and procedu ral choices confer
power. The unanimity requirement enabled French and Dutch
votes to stop ratification in its tracks. A supermajority requirement could have allowed the process to finish, and may have left
the rejecting members with a strong motivation to reconsider and
to ratify.
Without a unanimity requirement, the rejecting countries
would have to confront the rather potent symbolism of being left
behind by 22 member states under a new constitution. There is a
vast difference between a unanimity requirement that allows lone
dissenters to retain the present arrangement and a supermajority
requirement that effectively votes lone dissenters out of membership. In the early history of the new American republic, North
Carolina and Rhode Island were left to consider the implications
of going it alone after the 11 other states voted to ratify. In that
case , the survival of a new nation was at stake. Today, the power,
prestige and influence of Europe in an increasingly globalized
and competitive world system arguably hinges upon its ability to
further integrate . Thus, any reconsideration of an EU constitution- in whatever form it takes-will have to confront the implications of procedure, and seriously consider revising the rules
away from the "veto of one" format for ratification .
PROSPECTS AND POSSIBl LIT I ES: W HAT NEE DS T O CHANGE

Though the word "failed" figures prominently in the title of
this essay , it is a bit misleading. As of this writing, the constitutional treaty is in limbo, as the European Union announced, and
then extended, a "period of reflection." After the French and
Dutch no votes, European leaders were faced with two conflicting trends. The "Euroskeptics" hailed the rejection of the document and claimed to have the power, influenct: and momentum
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to make permanent its defeat. Yet, other governments, most notably Luxembourg, were distressed at the sudden call to cu11ail
further ratifying votes. In response, the European Counci l sought
a fonn of procedural compromise. As one observer noted,
Faced with these conflicting tendencies, the European
Council took not one decision but two: in effect, both to
continue with the ratification process despite the two rejections (but without the original deadline of October
2006) and, at the same time, to engage in a year's reflection, with no specified purpose, about the future of
Europe. Commentators, both in the media and in the
European Parliament, were unsympathetic. Nobody
could satisfactorily explain how it is possible to simultaneously both to ratify and to reflect (Duff 2005, 4).
In June 2005, parliaments in Latvia, Cyprus and Malta ratified
the document as scheduled. Luxembourg hdd a referendum in
mid-July. The parliaments of Belgium and Germany have already voted to ratify and final disposition awaits final signatures
and formalities. Estonia and Finland ratified the document in
mid-2006. Seven countries have put ratification voting on indefinite hold.
A number of commentators have observed that there is significance to the post-France/Netherlands votes, as a majority of
the member states have now approved the document. The fact
remains, however, that many of the seven holdout members are
likely no votes. This makes it unlikely that a meaningful supermajority of yes votes will be obtained in the next year or so. A
key provision in the constitution itself calls for a meeting of EU
leaders in the event that four-fifths of the member states have
ratified and the other members have not within two years of its
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signature. 20 Given the fact that most of the prominent EU leaders
want little to no change in the constitutional text, they consider
this threshold to be important. For them, reaching 20 ratification
votes will mean that a supermajority will have ratified the text in
its present form. Opponents of the Constitution have been critical
of using this provision to try to revive what is, in their eyes, a
dead letter.
A working conclusion is that the current constitutional text
cannot and will not be ratified by all (or nearly all) of the current
EU member states even after the extended period of reflection
has passed. As a consequence of this, some revision of the text,
the procedures for ratification or both need to be considered. The
author is very aware that these suggestions for change would
have been considered far-fetched at best before the season of
ratification began. At this point, it is impossible to predict which ,
if any, of these options will receive serious consideration. Yet,
two uncomfortable and unavoidable facts remain. First, the problems and challenges that brought about the Convention on the
Future of Europe have not disappeared. The economic challenges
of globalization, the questions surrounding enlargement and the
ongoing need for more effective and streamlined decision mak'" The original deadline J'or ratification was ovember, 2006. Since four-fifths of the
member states had not ratified at that point, the period of reflection (and, by implication,
the deadline) was extended. Declaration JO to the Constitutional Treaty provides that the
European Council can consider what next steps may be taken with the constitution al
treaty if the 4/5 mark is reached. However, it also built into the text (Article IV-445.2)
that unanimous agreement would still be needed for any change to the text, which would
place serious limits on the Council's ability to propose alternatives. See, in this regard,
Kurpas. Sebastian and Justus Schonlau. 2006. "Deadlock Avoided, But Sense of Mission
Lost? The Enlarged EU and its Uncertain Constitution." CEPS Policy Brief Centre for
European Policy Studies. No. 92. February. pp. 1-9.
Carlos Closa has asserted that Declaration JO implicitly commits national governments to take some action- referendum. parliamentary vote, or both-in order to verify
whether 20 or more members will ratify the Constitution. and then take appropriate action. C'losa. p. 2.
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ing all need to be addressed. Second, two core member states
have rejected the constitution by substantial margins. The lesson
gained from Ireland after its rejection of the Nice treaty in 1992
simply will not do here. In Ireland's case, a short pause, a minor
reworking of the text and a re-vote worked for a small single
rejection. 21 However, few, if any, observers see this pattern as
applicable to France and the Netherlands. So, in short, something
22
needs to happen, but not a recycling of the current text. To accommodate realities, the author offers the following possibilities:
( l) Form a Council on Revision to shorten, streamline and
simplify the document. This is not a proposal to drastically
change the substance of the constitution. Rather, an effort to
simplify the text would be a necessary first step toward making
its provisions more accessible and more understandable to the
European citizenry. I am cautioned by the scene in the film
Amadeus, where Emperor Joseph II, the superficial and selfabsorbed ruler who could not tell the difference between a great
opera and a mediocre one, complained that Mozart's music had
"too many notes." At the risk of voicing a complaint of "too
many words" with little sound constitutional theory to back the

" Whitman surveys the key reasons why responses to past referendum no votes do not
offer guidance for the present situation . lie points to the importance of the French and
Dutch positions as founding members of the EU. the high turnouts for the vote (nearly
double that of the Irish turnout for the Treaty or Nice referendum), and the dit'ficulty in
determining which specific parts of the Constitution occasioned the no votes . For a more
detailed treatment, see Whitman , pp. 681-682 .
" Of all the proposals following the French and Dutch vote, most agree thal the text
cannot be resubmitted to voters in France and the Netherlands (following a "cooling
period of an appropriate length) so that they can "get it right" on the second go-round .
Nor can either country entertain a procedural change whereby popular consent is bypassed in favor of a safer , more predictable, parliamentary vote . According to one
scholar, "To suggest that the genie of public opinion can be put back into the boule, and
replaced once again by eli1e-led, low-key, technocratic management of EU affairs is not
only politically unrealistic but also democratically disdainful" (de Burca 2006, 7).
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claim, evidence from the ratification debates indicate needed
pruning and tightening.
A shorter, more coherent document is a document that can be
understood by its readers and critics. And this appears to be a
key element to securing approval. As the ratification process began in late 2004, it was reported that polling across Europe had
shown that there was a widespread lack of knowledge about and
23
interest in the constitution. In one study, "a mere 11% of respondents said they knew what the constitution contains; 56%
said they knew little; and 33% said they had never even heard of
it." The poll went on to discover that "[t]he sort of people who
take the time to familiarize themselves with the document are
also the sort who support it-75% of the respondents who knew
its contents said they would vote for it. Only 22% of those who
have never heard of it are in favor" (Crumley 2005, 40).
If debate is to move from symbol to substance, the text will
need to be made more accessible and more cohesive. Most
scholars admit that the document could be shortened. It is hard to
deny the claim made on a campaign poster for French right-wing
politician Phillippe de Villiers that, with a text of 448 articles,
"we all have a reason to say no" (in Dehousse 2006, 160). The
question is how and where such shortening occurs.
(2) Mandate a uniform ratification mechanism for all member states that would reflect popular will and address the "legitimacy gap." Ratifying conventions, anyone? Perhaps the
European Union can tear a page out from the American handbook and write a more specific ratifying procedure into the
document that would dictate a particular format. Further, let that
fom1at draw from the strengths of both parliamentary debate and
" Sec Eurobarometer
lindings from the November , 2004 lield study at:
http://ec .europa.eu/publ ic_opinion /arch ives/ebs/ebs2 I 4_ en _Ii rst.pd f. A !so, see conclusions from June. 2004 Eurobarometcr poll, p. 41, note 13.
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popular discourse. Ratifying conventions similar to the ones held
by the nascent American states could provide an intriguing and
innovative alternative to the mish-mash of referenda, parliamentary votes and combination of the two exercised by the EU
member states last year (Warleigh 2003). 24 The composition of
the participants would reflect representation across the cultura l,
political and social spectrum and would address the ongoi ng
complaint that the framing of the constitution was dominated by
bureaucrats and elites . This would have to be a major compromise hammered out by the revision committee suggested above.
It would supersede constitutional mandates in a number of countries, which could lead to some political conflicts and constit utional challenges. 25 But, as a one-time event, it could rekind le
interest and focus attention on the core questions and challenges
that face the European Union at this pivotal time in its existence.
Andrew Duff, a member of the European Parliament, identifies
the connection between a shorter, more streamlined constitution
and the process of beginning a fresh round of ratification votes.
One problem will be to persuade the countries that have
already ratified the existing constitution to go through
the process all over again with an amended text. The new
" Alex Warleigh has suggested reconvening a constitutional convention that would draft
two potential constitutions . One would be an mtergovemmental model , with a greater
focus on the sovereign powers of the member states . I Jere, each member would hold
considerable power to both formulate and limit EU policies . The other model would be a
unitary one . in which EU leaders would be chosen directly from the overall European
electorate . The two draft documents would then be subject to pan-European referenda . II"
one model was favored by a clear majority , member states that had voted for the other
model would hold a second vote to detem1ine whether to stay in the EU. See details of
Warle1gh 's plan m Glenn , David . 2005 . "Making the C'ase for a United States of Europe ."
Chronicle of Higher £d11cmio11.
Vol. 51. Issue 44 . pp. A 12-A 14.
" Germany , for example, mandates a parliamentary vote for the approval of treaties . This
kept the Gcmian prime minister from having to confront the possibility of a referendum
in 2005 , as the leaders of France and Great Britain chose to. Constitutional provisions
such as these would complicate the call for a separate ratifying convention .
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version will clearly have to be much more attractive to
the general public if governments are to dare to seek a
second round of ratification and campaign hard for it.
But that in itself is an argument for making the new version more obviously responsive to public criticism and to
the real needs for better policies and decision-making
procedures in Brussels (Duff2005).

Evaluations of why the ratification failed can be placed in
two broad and conflicting camps. One sees the defeat as a serious setback that was occasioned by ignorance. Voters rejected a
move towards integration that was clearly in their best interests.
For supporters of the constitution, the season ofreflection should
be used to educate the citizens in the direction of reconsideration
and ratification. The second camp sees the ratification failure as
"a chance to review the model of European integration, to welcome the fact that at least some of the people of Europe have
finally had a say in the matter and to take their views into account in deciding where to go next" (Dale 2005, 4). This camp
would see the needed process of education pointed at leaders , not
citizens-addressing the democratic deficit by listening to what
the citizenry actually favors and opposes.
The ratifying convention format coupled with a more accessible constitutional text could potentially carve out a middle
ground between these two conflicting perspectives.
(3) Substitute a supermajority for the unanimous vote requirement. This is the easiest and perhaps most effective adaptation that can be made, though it would be subject to similar
complications as surveyed above (Closa 2005) .26 Again, a
~•·Closa asse11s that a "mi ni-Intergovernmental Conference" could refom, A11icle 48 of
the Treaty of European Union and remove the unanimity requirement. At the same time,
Anicle 477 of the Constitution (stipulating a unanimous vote for its entering into force)
would have to be removed . Unf'onunately, "the resulting Conslllution would technically
be a new one. (and) it would require a new round of ratification"(Closa 2005, 3).
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change in the rules can have an impact upon the outcome. The
diversity of opinion among the current EU members virtually
ensures that some major constitutional provision will alienate
some member states. One assessment concluded that
Different counties have problems with different aspects
of the text. While many people in France object to the
treaty because it does not go far enough toward a harmonized European social policy, the British and the Poles
are against any further social policy integration. The
French find serious fault with the treaty's failure to abolish the national veto on tax policy, whereas any reference
to taxation in the constitution is anathema to the UK and
Ireland (Spinant 2005, 4).

Earlier, member states, especially Britain, strenuously argued
against changing unanimous ratification. The outcome of the
French and Dutch votes may have softened this stance.
As of this writing, the treaty arrangement has not caused
enough complications or discomfort to push some member states
to change their stance on the unanimous vote requirement. 27 It
may take some further economic problems, a keener perception
of Europe's eroding power base in global affairs, a security crisis, or an emerging post-constitutional dialogue that looks to this
procedural requirement to answer "what went wrong." In whatever way it does happen, it is almost mandatory that this requirement changes before any reconsideration
of the
constitution-in any form- has a chance at success.

07

This is not to say that there are no calls for reform. In February 2006, British Prime
Minister Tony Blair said, "I accept we will need to return to the issues around the European Constitullon. A European Union of 25 cannot function properly with today's rules
of governance. Having spent 6 months as EU President, I am a good willless lo that (in
Baldwin 2006, 14)."Ba ldwin concludes that a "tipping point" will be reached in the near
future and a broad consensus will emerge that institutional reform is imperative (p. 14).
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CONCLUSIONS

The assessment of the ratification of the EU constitution and
the suggestions for the future are pointedly and unavoidably
American in perspective. It may come too close to the line where
comparative method lapses into constitutional chauvinism. It
could be charged that someone who spent a full year visiting in
most every EU country should be able to do better than simply
graft the American experience of centuries past onto to European
experiment. The author is not aware of these problems when
comparing the two ventures in constitution-making.
And yet, somewhere along the way, the EU constitution
failed. It was not scripted to do so. The motives were good, the
time and effort expended over 16 months was extraordinary and
the finished product did what it was intended to do. But other
choices, dealing with the size and scope of the text and the procedures for its ratification, scuttled the project. If this is a project
worth reviving and a goal worth achieving, some changes and
adaptations will need to be made. The square peg of the EU text
does not need to be jammed into the round ho le of the American
experience. However, guidance may be gained from looking at
an American Constitution's framing, ratification and endurance
as a viable and workable charter of government. A balance can
be found between using the American model as a blueprint and
ignoring it completely. This study identifies selected areas that
may inform and assist future efforts to secure a Constitution for
the European Union.
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